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In this article we explore the problem of chore division, which is closely related to a 
classical question, due to Steinhaus [10], of how to cut a cake fairly. We focus on con- 
structive solutions, that is, those obtained via a well-defined procedure or algorithm. 
Among the many notions of fairness is envy-freeness: an envy-free cake division is a 
set of cuts and an allocation of the pieces that gives each person what she feels is the 
largest piece. It is non-trivial to find such a division, since the cake may not be homo- 
geneous and player valuations on subsets of cake will differ, in general. Much progress 
has been made on finding constructive algorithms for achieving envy-free cake divi- 
sions; most recently, Brams and Taylor [3] produced the first general n-person pro- 
cedure. The recent books by Brams and Taylor [4] and Robertson and Webb [8] give 
surveys on the cake-cutting literature. 
In contrast to cakes, which are desirable, the dual problem of chore division is 
concerned with dividing an object deemed undesirable. Here, each player would like 
to receive what he considers to be the smallest piece of, say, a set of chores. This 
problem appears to have been first introduced by Martin Gardner [6]. 
Much less work has been done to develop algorithms for chore division than for 
cake-cutting. Of course, for 2 people, the familiar I-cut-you-choose cake-cutting pro- 
cedure also works for dividing chores: one cuts the chores and the other chooses what 
she feels is the smallest piece. Oskui [8, p. 73] gave the first envy-free solutions for 
chore division among 3 people. Su [12] developed an envy-free chore-division algo- 
rithm for an arbitrary number of players; however, it does not yield an exact solution, 
but only an s-approximate one. There appear to be no exact envy-free chore-division 
algorithms for more than three players in the literature; in unpublished manuscripts, 
Brams and Taylor [2] and Peterson and Su [7] offer n-person algorithms but these are 
not bounded in the number of steps they require. 
In this article, we develop a simple and bounded procedure for envy-free chore di- 
vision among 4 players. The reader will find that many of the ideas involved moving 
knives, trimming and lumping, and a notion of "irrevocable advantage" provide a 
nice introduction to similar techniques that arise in the literature onfair division prob- 
lems. As a warm-up to some of these ideas, we also present a 3-person solution that is 
simpler and more symmetrical than the procedure of Oskui. 
We assume throughout his paper that chores are infinitely divisible. This is not 
unreasonable, as a finite set of chores can be partitioned by dividing up each chore (for 
instance, a lawn to be mowed could be divided just as if it were a cake), or dividing the 
time spent on them. We also assume that player valuations over subsets of the chores 
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are additive, that is, no value is destroyed or created by cutting or lumping pieces 
together. (The proper context for modeling player valuations is measure theory, but we 
can avoid that for the purposes of this article.) 
A 3-person chore-division procedure We first describe a simpler 3-person chore- 
division procedure, which introduces ome ideas that are important later. 
Our 3-person chore-division procedure relies on Austin's procedure [1] for dividing 
a cake into two pieces so that each of two players believes it is a 50-50 split. For 
completeness, we review it here. Let one player hold two knives over the cake, with one 
at the left edge, such that the portion of cake between them is what she believes to be 
exactly half. If the second player agrees that it is exactly half, we are done. Otherwise, 
let the first player move the knives across the cake from left to right, keeping the 
portion between them exactly half (in her estimation), until the second player agrees it 
is exactly half. (There must be such a point because when the rightmost knife reaches 
the right edge, the leftmost knife must be where the rightmost knife began, hence 
the second player must by that point have changed preferences.) At this point cuts 
are made and the pieces of cake outside the knives are lumped together, yielding two 
pieces that both players agree are exactly equal. 
Austin's procedure is an example of what is sometimes called a "moving-knife" 
procedure in the cake-cutting literature [5]. Our 3-person chore-division algorithm is 
also a moving-knife procedure. The key idea is to divide the chores into six pieces and 
assign each player two of the pieces that he feels are at least as small as each pair of 
pieces the other players receive. 
A THREE-PERSON ENVY-FREE CHORE-DIVISION PROCEDURE 
Step 1. Divide the chores into three portions using any 3-person envy-free cake- 
division procedure (that guarantees players a piece they think is largest), such 
as the Stromquist moving-knife procedure [11]. Now label each portion by 
the name of the player to whom the cake-division procedure would assign that 
portion (this player believes that portion is largest). 
Step 2. Let player i divide portion i into 2 pieces (which she feels is exactly half) and 
assign those pieces to the other two players such that they each feel they have 
received no more than half of portion i. (This can be achieved via Austin's 
procedure: letting player i and one other player, say j, agree on a 50-50 split, 
let the remaining player choose the half she thinks is smallest, and give the 
other half to j.) 
Step 3. Repeat Step 2 for each player, then end the procedure. 
We now verify that each player has been assigned two out of six total pieces such 
that each feels her share is smallest. 
Call the players i, j, and k. Player i will not envy player j because one piece of 
each of their pairs came from the portion labelled k, and i feels her half of that portion 
was no larger than j's. As for her other piece, player i feels it was no more than half 
of the portion it came from, and therefore cannot be as large as player j's other piece, 
which i felt was exactly half of the largest portion. The same argument holds for any 
permutation of i, j, and k. See FIGURE 1. 
This procedure requires at most 8 cuts (Step 1 uses 2 cuts, and Austin's proce- 
dure uses at most 2 cuts each time it is applied; in FIGURE 1, some pieces may have 
been reassembled for simplicity). It is also less complicated than the discrete proce- 
dure of Oskui [8]. There are some 3-person moving-knife schemes that require fewer 
cuts [8, 9], but our approach is distinguished by being symmetric with respect to the 
players and being based on a cake-cutting procedure. The former property simplifies 
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Figure 1 An envy-free assignment of six pieces (of chores) to three people 
the verification of envy-freeness, while the latter property may help in generalizing the 
scheme to more players via known cake-cutting algorithms. 
A 4-Person Chore-division Procedure We now describe our 4-person chore- 
division procedure, which is also a moving-knife procedure and requires at most 16 
cuts. It draws ideas from both the Brams-Taylor-Zwicker 4-person envy-free moving- 
knife scheme for cakes [5] and the Oskui 3-person envy-free discrete chore-division 
scheme [8]. We also show how the notion of irrevocable advantage, important in 
cake-cutting [4], can be applied in chore division. 
Suppose the players are named Alice, Betty, Carl, and Debbie. For convenience, we 
assume the chores are a rectangular block that may be divided by vertical cuts. Let 
Alice and Betty divide the chores into four pieces they both agree are all equal, by 
performing three applications of Austin's procedure (using at most 6 cuts). 
Call the pieces X1, X2, X3, and X4. Note that if Debbie and Carl disagree on which 
piece is the smallest, we can immediately allocate the pieces. Thus we may assume 
they agree that one piece is strictly smaller than the others, say X4. Then each person 
thinks the following: 
Alice: X1 = X2 = X3 = X4 
Betty: X1 = X2 = X3 = X4 
Carl: X4 < X1, X2, X3 
Debbie: X4 < X1, X2, X3 
Now, for each of X1, X2, and X3, let Debbie and Carl mark how they would trim them 
to make them the same size as X4. As each piece is rectangular, assume the trimmings 
are marked from the top edge, so that a person receives the piece below her mark. 
See FIGURE 2. Hence, we can speak of one mark as being higher than another. The 
following procedure will yield an envy-free chore division (we've already described 
Step 1): 
A FOUR-PERSON E VY-FREE CHORE-DIVISION PROCEDURE 
Step 1. Let Alice and Betty use three applications of Austin's procedure (6 cuts) to 
obtain 4 pieces (X1, X2, X3, X4) that Alice and Betty believe are exactly equal 
in size. If Carl and Debbie disagree on which piece is smallest, then allocate 
the pieces accordingly and end the procedure. Otherwise, call X4 the piece 
that Carl and Debbie agree is smallest. 
Step 2. Let Carl and Debbie mark X1, X2, X3 where they would cut them to create 
ties for smallest with X4. Without loss of generality, suppose Debbie has more 
marks higher than Carl's. Trim the pieces at the higher marks (3 cuts), and set 
aside the trimmings. 
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Figure 2 This figure shows a possible set of markings made in Step 1 of our 4-person 
procedure 
Step 3. Let Betty add back to one piece some of the corresponding trimming (1 cut) 
to create a two-way tie for smallest piece. 
Step 4. Let players choose from these pieces in the order Alice-Betty-Carl-Debbie, 
with Betty required to take the added-back piece if Alice didn't, and Carl 
required to choose a piece trimmed at his marking if it is available. This will 
allocate everything except the trimmings in an envy-free fashion. 
Step 5. Divide the trimmings (6 cuts), exploiting an irrevocable advantage of Betty 
over whomever receives X4. (The concept of an irrevocable advantage is de- 
fined and explained later.) This will allocate the trimmings in an envy-free 
fashion. 
We now verify that this yields an envy-free solution. We assumed in Step 2 that 
Debbie has more higher marks than Carl (if not, just reverse the roles of Carl and 
Debbie in what follows). This produces two cases, the first in which Debbie has three 
higher marks and the second in which Debbie has two. 
Case I: Debbie has three higher marks. Assume that Debbie's marks are all at or 
above Carl's marks. Following Step 2, let Debbie trim X1, X2, and X3 at her marks 
to obtain a four-way tie for the smallest piece. Call the trimmed pieces X1, X2, and 
X3, and the trimmings T1, T2, and T3, which are set aside for later. At this point, each 
person thinks: 
Alice: X1, X2, X3 < X4 
Betty: X1, X2, X3 < X4 
Carl: X4 < Xl, X2, X3 
Debbie: X1 = X2 = X3 = X4. 
Carl must believe X4 iS the smallest, or tied for the smallest, because his marks were 
all at or below Debbie's (meaning he believes more should be trimmed to make them 
equal to X4). 
Of the remaining pieces X1, X2, X3, suppose without loss of generality that Betty 
believes X3 < X2 < X1. Following Step 3, let Betty return some of the trimmings T3 
to X3 to create a two-way tie for the smallest piece. (We still call the modified piece 
X3, and its trimmings T3.) Thus player valuations change: 
Alice: X1, X2, X3 < X4 
Betty: X2 = X3 < X1 < X4 
Carl: X4 < Xl, X2, X3 
Debbie: X1 = X2 = X4 < X3. 
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Following Step 4, Alice chooses first (hence is envy-free), then Betty, who is required 
to take X3 if it was not chosen by Alice. Since Betty has at least one of X2, X3 to choose 
from, she is envy-free. Then Carl chooses, and will clearly still have his smallest piece 
X4 available. Debbie will have one of her three smallest pieces available because Betty 
took X3 if Alice did not. Thus all are non-envious of the portions they have recieved 
so far. 
Dividing the Trimmings. The trimmings till need to be divided and assigned. With- 
out loss of generality, suppose that Betty chose X3 in the procedure above. Then Betty 
thinks 
Betty: T1, T2 < T3. 
Note that because Betty believed X3 = X4, she could receive all of T3 and still not 
envy Carl. In fact, by the above inequality she could receive 3 (T1 + T2 + T3) < T3 and 
still not envy him. We will say that Betty has an irrevocable advantage over Carl with 
respect to the trimmings. 
So, lump all the trimmings together (say, T = T1 + T2 + T3), and let Alice and 
Debbie use Austin's procedure to divide T into four pieces that they both agree are 
all equal. Then let the players choose in the order Carl, Betty, and then (in any order) 
Debbie and Alice. 
With respect to the trimmings, Carl will envy no one because he chooses first. Betty, 
choosing the smallest of the remaining three pieces, will have a piece that she believes 
is at most 3 T and therefore will not envy Carl. Alice and Debbie will not envy Betty 
or Carl because they think all four pieces are equal. Thus the trimmings can be divided 
in an envy-free fashion. 
Case II: Debbie has two higher marks. Assume now that Debbie has two marks at 
or above Carl's marks. Without loss of generality suppose that Carl has a higher mark 
on X3 than Debbie, as in FIGURE 2. Following Step 2, let cuts be made at all three 
highest marks. Then 
Alice: X1, X2, X3 < X4 
Betty: X1, X2 X3 < X4 
Carl: X3 = X4 < Xl, X2 
Debbie: X1 = X2 = X4 < X3. 
Following Step 3, let Betty create a two-way tie for the smallest piece (as before) 
by returning to the smallest piece some of the corresponding trimmings. She may add 
either to X1, X2 or X3. The X1 and X2 cases are equivalent, so we have two subcases. 
Suppose Betty adds to X3 until it is as large as, say, X2. Then 
Alice: X1, X2, X3 < X4 
Betty: X2 = X3 < X1 < X4 
Carl: X4 < X1, X2 X3 
Debbie: X1 = X2 = X4 < X3. 
These inequalities are identical to those in Case I, and thus our procedure works in the 
same way. Moreover, the trimmings can be handled just as before, since Betty has an 
irrevocable advantage over Carl (who receives X4). 
Otherwise, suppose Betty adds to X1 until it is as large as, say, X2 (the X3 case is 
similar). Then 
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Alice: Xl, X2, X3 < X4 
Betty: Xl = X2 < X3 < X4 
Carl: X3 = X4 < Xl, X2 
Debbie: X2 = X4 < Xl, X3. 
Following Step 4, let Alice choose first. When Betty chooses, she will have one of her 
two smallest pieces available (and will take Xl if available as the procedure requires). 
Next, the procedure requires Carl to take X3 if available (since it was the piece trimmed 
at his marking) and otherwise he recieves X4; either way he believes he has the smallest 
piece. As Xl and X3 are allocated by this point, we know that Debbie will receive 
either X2 or X4, and hence is also envy-free. For the trimmings, note that Betty has an 
irrevocable advantage over whomever receives the X4 piece, so the trimmings can be 
divided using the method discussed earlier. 
This concludes the verification of envy-freeness for all cases. Note that we could 
alternately have presented tables for each case that list envy-free assignments for Betty, 
Carl, and Debbie given what Alice chose first. However, remembering those tables 
would not be as easy as remembering the steps of our procedure. 
A bounded n-person procedure? Our procedure gives the first known bounded pro- 
cedure for 4-person envy-free chore division, requiring at most 16 cuts. Actually, this 
can be reduced to 15 cuts with a modification much like Brams-Taylor-Zwicker's 5-cut 
modification [5] of the triple application of Austin's procedure. 
Although the reader may be tempted to try to further reduce the number of cuts 
needed for 4-person envy-free chore division, progress in this direction is not as impor- 
tant as the more compelling problem of finding any bounded procedure for more than 
4 players. While there do exist finite n-person envy-free chore-division procedures 
([2], [7]), these are not bounded in the number of steps or cuts, that is, depending on 
player preferences, they could take arbitrarily long to resolve. For cake-cutting as well 
as chore division, the existence of bounded n-person envy-free division procedures 
remains a major unsolved problem that will probably require new techniques. 
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